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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ZACKARY JAMES STEVENS,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48399-2020
Ada County Case No.
CR01-17-53797
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Stevens failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its sentencing discretion
when it imposed an aggregate unified 12-year sentence with four years fixed upon Stevens’
guilty pleas to possession of heroin and unlawful possession of a firearm?
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ARGUMENT
Stevens Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
In December 2017 in Ada County, officers were called to a Jackson’s gas station parking

lot about an individual who was passed out in a running vehicle. (PSI, p.116. 1) Officers made
contact with and woke up the individual, who was covered with sweat and acting confused. (Id.)
The individual initially provided officers a false name, but was eventually identified as Zachary
Stevens. (Id.) A records check revealed that Stevens had four active warrants. (Id.) Officers
placed Stevens in custody. (Id.)
A subsequent search of Stevens’ vehicle revealed over 30 syringes and multiple plastic
baggies containing various brown, white, black tar, and green leafy substances. (PSI, pp.116117.) Officers also recovered two metal spoons with burnt residue, and two firearms in the glove
box – which Stevens, a convicted felon, could not lawfully possess. (Id.) Both firearms had a
bullet in the chamber. (PSI, p.117.) Stevens was transported to jail, where a syringe cap was
located in his jacket pocket. (Id.) Testing revealed that the substances recovered were heroin,
marijuana, and Alpha-PHP (a designer drug). (PSI, pp.117, 122, 124-125.)
The state charged Stevens with possession of heroin, two counts of unlawful possession
of a firearm, possession of marijuana, possession of Alpha-PHP, possession of drug
paraphernalia, providing false information to law enforcement, and the persistent violator
sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.31-33, 40-41.) Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state,
Stevens pled guilty to heroin possession and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm, and
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Citations to page numbers of the “PSI” refer to the page numbers of the electronic file
containing the PSI associated with this case, and all attachments (which include previously
conducted PSIs).
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the state agreed to dismiss the other five charges and the persistent violator enhancements. (R.,
pp.49-50; 7/16/18 Tr., p.7, L.16 – p.22, L.16.) Sentencing recommendations were left open. (R.,
p.50; 7/16/18 Tr., p.8, Ls.6-11; p.8, L.24 – p.9, L.2.)
Citing Stevens’ extensive criminal history and the need for Stevens to face consequences
for his actions, the district court imposed a unified seven-year sentence with one-year fixed for
heroin possession, and a consecutive five-year sentence with three years fixed for unlawful
possession of a firearm. (R., pp.62-65; 10/15/18 Tr., p.16, L.13 – p.18, L.14.) This resulted in
an aggregate 12-year unified sentence with four years fixed. Stevens did not initially file a
timely notice of appeal, however, pursuant to a subsequent district court order granting postconviction relief, the judgment of conviction was re-entered so that Stevens could file a timely
appeal. (R., pp.67-73.)
On appeal, Stevens asserts that the sentences imposed by the district court were
excessive, and that the court failed to give proper consideration to existing mitigating factors.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-8.)

However, a review of the record supports the district court’s

sentencing determination.
B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering

the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007)
(citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144
Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d
614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). The abuse of
3

discretion test looks to whether the district court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194
(2018).
C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To establish that the sentence was excessive, the
appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution. Id. at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895-96, 392
P.3d 1228, 1236-37 (2017) (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628
(2015)). It is well established that the primary sentencing consideration is protection of society,
and that all other factors must be subservient to that end. State v. Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623, 627,
873 P.2d 877, 881 (1994).
In this case, prior to imposing sentence, the district court noted that it had reviewed
“everything” in the record, including the letters submitted to the court by Stevens and his father.
(10/15/18 Tr., p.15, L.1 – p.16, L.4.) The court imposed a unified aggregate 12-year sentence
with four years fixed. (10/15/18 Tr., p.17, L.21 – p.18, L.3.) A review of the record supports the
court’s sentencing determination.
4

Stevens’ extensive criminal history justified the sentences imposed. At the time of his
arrest in the current case, Stevens already had several pending criminal charges against him.
(PSI, pp.13-14.) A 2016 incident, which ultimately resulted in dismissed charge (PSI, p.13),
demonstrated, as in the present case, Stevens’ propensity for falling asleep or passing out in
parking lots while in possession of weapons, while seemingly being under the influence and
having recently driven. (PSI, pp.57-58.) In that case, after truck stop employees found Stevens
passed out in his vehicle, officers responded, found Stevens to be “very out of it,” then recovered
a pocketknife and a syringe on Stevens’ person, and drug paraphernalia in his vehicle. (Id.)
Prior to this, Stevens had numerous criminal convictions for offenses which, as the district court
noted at the sentencing hearing, went “beyond merely drug crimes.” (10/15/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.1318.) Stevens has prior convictions for reckless driving, driving a vehicle without the owner’s
consent, disturbing the peace (amended from battery), driving under the influence, reckless
burning (in Washington), resisting or obstructing officers, false personation, failing to notify
upon striking a highway fixture, petit theft, numerous convictions for driving without privileges,
and three felony drug convictions. (PSI, pp.7-14.)
Through these prior convictions, Stevens has received treatment and opportunities for
supervision. After his 2012 felony conviction, Stevens was returned to custody after parole
violations on four different occasions. (PSI, pp.15, 48-51, 64-75) Stevens has completed
numerous rehabilitative programming, and has had opportunities for a rider and an enrollment in
the CAPP program. (PSI, pp.15, 242.) The presentence investigation materials also illustrate
Stevens’ continuing difficulty in following the rules even while in jail custody. (PSI, pp.16, 44,
76-84, 223-233.)
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At the sentencing hearing, the district court noted this “revolving door” journey through
the criminal justice system and openly reasoned about how best to help Stevens at this point.
(10/15/18 Tr., p.17, Ls.3-18.) Ultimately, the court reasonably concluded that another rider
would not provide Stevens enough of a consequence for his misconduct, and that term of prison
was appropriate.

(10/15/18 Tr., p.17, Ls.11-18.)

This reasoning was consistent with the

comments and analysis of Stevens set forth by the presentence investigator:
Based on Mr. Stevens’ history, coupled with his ongoing criminal
behavior, it appears as though Mr. Stevens has not internalized the severity of his
actions and has repeatedly displayed a lack of intrinsic motivation to change.
Previously imposed sanctions, programs, and attempts at correct actions have
failed to satisfy the goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or achieved community
safety.
(PSI, p.23.)
The presentence investigator also reasonably surmised that “[c]onsidering his willingness
to continue in risky behavior escalating to intravenous drug use, combined with continued
convictions for Driving Without Privileges it is reasonable to infer that [Stevens] is not
considering his sobriety before putting himself on the roads.” (Id.)
The district court also took particular note (10/15/18 Tr., p.15, Ls.6-9) of Stevens’ LSI-R
score of 40, which is well above the 31+ threshold for a “high risk” of recidivisms. (PSI, pp.2223, 41). Additionally, when Stevens asserted at the sentencing hearing that he did not know of
the presence of the guns recovered in his glove box at the time of his arrest (10/15/18 Tr., p.12,
L.2 – p.14, L.9), which was contrary to his sworn statements made at the change of plea hearing
(7/16/18 Tr., p.21, L.24 – p.22, L.9), the court noted that Stevens was lying to it in one of the two
instances, and that this demonstrated Stevens’ “underlying criminal thinking.” (10/15/18 Tr.,
p.12, L.25 – p.14, L.6; p.17, Ls.6-10.)
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On appeal, Stevens does not take issue with any of the stated analyses as set forth by the
district court, but instead simply asserts the existence of certain mitigating factors – including
Stevens’ substance abuse issues, amenability to treatment, mental health issues, and family
support. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-8.) However, nothing in the record indicates that the district
court failed to consider any of these things. Further, the mitigating effect of these factors was
limited, particularly when balanced against the aggravating factors as discussed above. For
example, while Stevens reported some prior diagnoses of mental health issues (PSI, p.19), the
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare’s Review of Stevens’ GAIN-I Core Assessment
concluded that Stevens did not present with mental health needs (PSI, p.22, 38-40), and Stevens’
counsel subsequently declined the district court’s offer to order a mental health evaluation
(10/15/18 Tr., p.7, Ls.14-21). Finally, it is clear that the district court was fully aware of and
gave consideration to Stevens’ substance abuse issues, and considered those issues in the context
of Stevens’ unsuccessful journey through the criminal justice system’s “revolving door” of
probation, parole, and attempted treatment. (See
- - 10/15/18 Tr., p.15, L.1 – p.17, L.23.)
In light of all of the factors discussed above, the district court acted well within its
discretion to impose an aggregate unified 12-year sentence with four years fixed upon Stevens’
guilty pleas to possession of heroin and unlawful possession of a firearm. Stevens has therefore
failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its sentencing discretion. This Court should
affirm the judgment of conviction.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the sentencing determination of the
district court.
DATED this 22nd day of April, 2021.

/s/ Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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